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APPLICATION OF "SoLE AcToR" DOCTRINE

- Defendant executed a note for $12,500 to the Taylor National Bank, due
six months after date, at the request of one Morton, president and cashier of the
bank. Defendant was told by Morton that the instrument was purely an accomodation note, that he would never have to pay anything on account of it
and that before using it Morton would see that good and sufficient collateral
was placed with it. In defense to an action on the note by the receiver of the bank,
the defendant charged that the bank had knowledge of the conditions and purposes for which the note was signed because of "the sole actor" doctrine and
consequently the receiver was estopped to bring this action. Held, that since the
"sole actor" doctrine does not apply and the bank is not charged with the
knowledge of its agent, Morton, the receiver has a good cause of action on the
note. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Pendleton, (D. C. Ky. 1939) 29 F. Supp.

779•
It has become axiomatic in the law of agency that the knowledge of the
agent will be imputed to the principal.1 This doctrine is based on the theory
that the agent is under a duty to the principal to communicate to him any
knowledge received by him as an agent and on the presumption that this duty
has been performed. 2 However, there are certain exceptions to this rule. The
knowledge of the agent will not be imputed to the principal where the agent
has a duty to someone else not to disclose,8 or where the agent is acting ad-

1 2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., § 1803 (1914); I AGENCY REsTATEMENT, §
272 (1933); Laukkare v. Abramson, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 447, 50 P. (2d) 478 (1935).
Knowledge of the plaintiff's attorney that the plaintiff's claim had been rejected was
held to be the knowledge of the plaintiff.
2 2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., § 1806 (1914); The Distilled Spirits, II Wall.
(78 U. S.) 356 (1870). A somewhat different theory is employed in Hall & Brown
Woodworking Machine Co. v. Haley Furniture & Mfg. Co., 174 Ala. 190, 56 So.
726 ( I 911}. There the court holds that the knowledge received by an agent while so
acting is constructive notice to the principal and the principal is conclusively bound by
it. This court adopts the approach that there is a legal identity of the principal with
the agent while acting within the scope of his authority.
3 2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., § 1814 (1914); The Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall.
(78 U.S.) 356 at 367 (1870).
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versely to the interests of the principal.4 The logical justification for the latter
exception is found in the world of experience, for it is undisputed that the presumption of non-disclosure by the agent acting adversely to the principal is
stronger than the presumption of disclosure arising out of the agency relationship. 5 But this exception to the rule is qualified in some jurisdictions by the
application of the "sole actor" doctrine. The "sole actor" doctrine is not concerned with establishing the existence of an agency relatio'ns~ip, but is concerned only with imputing the knowledge of the agent to the principal in an
already expressly created agency relationship. The application of this doctrine
is appropriate where there is a single agent of the principal in the transaction
involved; in such a case, the knowledge of the agent is imputed to the principal
regardless of whether or not the agent is acting adversely to the interest of the
principal. 6 In the instant case, while admitting the validity of the "sole actor"
doctrine, the court held that this was not a proper case for its application. A
broader rule was found cutting across the "sole actor" doctrine-that a principal
is not bound by the knowledge of an agent acting in collusion with a third party
where the liability of the principal to the third party is involved. 7 The court
4 2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed.,§ 1815 (1914); Lohmuller Bldg. Co. v. Gamble,
160 Md. 534, 154 A. 41 ( 1931). Here the president of a bank acting in anothe~
capacity had procured a promissory note by fraud which was discounted by the bank.
The court refused to allow the defense that the knowledge of the president concerning
the fraudulent transaction was imputed to the bank, since the interest of the president
as agent was adverse to that of the bank as principal.
5 American Nat. Bank of Nashville v. Miller, 229 U. S. 517, 33 S. Ct. 883
(1913). In refusing to charge the Macon Bank with knowedge of its president's insolvency, the Court affirmed the rule that where it is to the interest of the agent not
to disclose, there will be no presumption of disclosure. Those jurisdictions which hold
knowledge of the agent to be constructive knowledge to the principal on the theory
of legal identity reach the same result by reasoning that the agent is acting outside the
scope of his authority when his conduct is adverse to the principal. 2 MECHEM,
AGENCY, 2d ed., § 1816 (1914); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Local Bldg. &
Loan Assn., 162 Okla. 141, 19 P. (2d) 612 (1933).
6 State Bank of Pamplin v. Payne, 156 Va. 837, 159 S. E. 163 (1931) (where
the bank was not allowed to recover on notes deposited with the cashier of the bank
for a particular purpose and fraudulently filled in by the cashier, because the knowledge
of the cashier, sole representative of the bank in the transaction, was imputed to the
bank); National Bank of San Mateo v. Whitney, 40 Cal. App. 276, 180 P. 845
(1919); Munroe v. Harriman, (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 493, affirming
(D. C. N. Y. 1935) 16 F. Supp. 341. In the last case the "sole actor" doctrine was
extended to cover a case in which several agents were involved in the same transaction. This case is discussed in 35 M1cH, L. REv. 686 (1937), and 31 ILL. L. REV.
971 ( 1937).
7 Steigerwalt v. Woodhead Co., 186 Minn. 558, 244 N. W. 412 (1932); Standard Savings & Loan Assn. v. Fitts, 120 Tex, 303, 39 S. W. (2d) 25 (1930). First
Nat. Bank of Reedley v. Reed, 198 Cal. 252, 244 P. 368 (1926), has dictum to the
effect that where the agent and the third party are acting in collusion to defraud the
principal, the principal will not be held bound by the knowledge of the agent. The case
is interesting because of the close similarity in the facts to the principal case, differing
only in that there was no fraud committed against the principal in the California decision. In Boles v. Hartsfield Co., 50 Ga. App. 442, 178 S. E. 416 (1935), the agent
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found that the defendant could scarcely have thought that this was a legitimate
transaction and either knew or should have known that the principal had no
knowledge of the act of its agent. 8 Once collusion was established between the
third party (defendant) and the agent, the conclusion of the court seems to be
satisfactory, for certainly the "sole actor" doctrine was never intended to be
used as a weapon against the principal by one who entered into a transaction
with an agent knowing that the agent was committing a fraud on the principal.

promised to pay the note of defendant third party, but notice of this was not imputed
to the principal because of the collusion of agent and defendant.
8 The court prefers to express itself in these words: "It is more charitable to say
that Pendleton never thought at all••••" 29 F. Supp. at 782. This language leaves a
strong inference that the court had come to the conclusion that there was collusion
between the defendant and the agent, Morton.

